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ABSTRACT
This study explored the views of both auditors in the National Audit Department (NAD), 
and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) members toward the current performance-audit 
practices in the Malaysian public sector by interviewing selected members of each group. 
Results revealed that the views of these two groups diverged on several issues concerning 
auditor roles and responsibilities, auditor competence and independence, as well as the 
format, content and usefulness of the audit reports. The most significant divergence was 
in the respective views on the auditors’ responsibilities for fraud detection.
Keywords: Performance auditing, Auditor General, Public sector accounting, Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
Performance auditing has been recognised 
as an important management tool for 
monitoring the performance of government 
agencies (Driessen & Molenkamp, 1993; 
Rauum & Soniat, 1993; AGA, 2006). 
Generally, auditing is used to evaluate 
specific government programmes to 
determine their efficiency, effectiveness of 
implementation and fiscal responsibility, 
as well as to decide on whether the 
programmes have achieved their goals.
The development of performance 
auditing in Malaysia can be traced back to 
1978. The public (via Parliament) realised 
that audit reports based on financial 
information alone were not sufficient to 
hold government agencies accountable 
in carrying out their programmes and 
activities (Hazman, 1991). Consequently, 
the National Audit Department (NAD), 
as the institution responsible for auditing 
all government entities, was given the 
authority to amend the Audit Act of 1957. 
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Section 6(d) of the Act gave the Auditor 
General power to inquire whether the 
resources allocated by the parliament 
were being applied efficiently to selected 
governmental programmes and activities. 
Four years later, a second amendment 
was passed, expanding the audit scope to 
include performance auditing, giving the 
Auditor General the authority to question 
government agencies on the effectiveness 
of their programmes.
The major focus of this study was 
to investigate the current strengths and 
weaknesses of performance auditing and to 
determine the type of improvements to be 
done. Even though performance auditing 
has been in place in Malaysia for more than 
three decades, there is growing evidence that 
auditing recommendations are not consistently 
implemented (Daud, 2008), and there have 
been no studies on how the recipients actually 
use the audit reports. If performance auditing 
is to be a useful tool that can add value to 
the performance of government agencies, 
the audit reports must clearly understood 
and their recommendations implemented. 
There is, therefore, a clear need for a new 
research on users’ perceptions toward, and 
expectations of, audit reports. There is no 
point in providing audit services if they do 
not result in efficiency and productivity 
improvements.
This study contributes to these efforts 
in two ways. First, it adds to the literature 
on performance auditing in developing 
countries. Secondly, the findings can 
help auditors in these countries become 
more effective. The success or failure 
of performance auditing needs to be 
measured not only from the perspective of 
the auditors, but also from the perspective 
of the users of audit reports, in this case, 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
members. The findings of this study can be 
useful to NAD in their policy formulation 
and in developing programmes to optimise 
the value of performance auditing so that it 
can adequately fulfil the information needs 
of Malaysian users.
The remainder of this paper is 
organised as follows. The next section 
provides background on performance 
auditing in Malaysia and its relationship 
with NAD, which includes a brief 
discussion of some previous studies. The 
report then outlines the research method 
used and discusses the findings. The final 
section presents the conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Performance Auditing and National Audit 
Department (NAD)
National Audit Department (NAD) is the 
national agency in Malaysia that has been 
given the mandate to conduct various types 
of audits of public agencies throughout the 
country. NAD was originally empowered 
by two laws: the Malaysian Constitution 
and the Audit Act of 1957. According 
to Article 105 of the Constitution, the 
Auditor General is the head of NAD who 
is appointed by the Yang DiPertuan Agong 
(YDPA) on the advice of the Prime Minister 
after consultation with the Conference of 
Rulers. NAD assists the Auditor General in 
implementing the audit mandate to provide 
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an independent review of the performance 
and financial management of public sector 
agencies and bodies (NAD, 2006). Under 
Sections 9 (1) and 6 of the Audit Act of 
1957, NAD is entrusted with the task of 
ensuring accountability in the administration 
and management of public funds through 
the audit of accounts and activities of the 
Federal government, State governments, 
statutory bodies, local authorities, and the 
Islamic Religious Councils, and a few other 
publicly funded organisations.
Prior Studies
A review of the literature shows that most 
studies of performance auditing have been 
confined to developed countries mainly 
in the U.K., New Zealand and Australia. 
Furthermore, many of these studies 
concentrated mainly on concepts rather 
than on the practical side of performance 
auditing. To date, only Pendlebury and 
Shreim (1990; 1991), Chowdhury and 
Innes (1998) and Johnsen et al. (2005) 
have undertaken research to investigate 
the divergence of views between auditors 
and users toward performance auditing 
practices in the public sector. An earlier 
empirical study was conducted in the U.K. 
by Pendlebury and Shreim (1990) with 
the objective of examining the attitudes of 
external auditors on the implementation 
effectiveness of audits in the public sector. 
The external auditors in that study included 
those from the Audit Commission, some 
from the National Audit Office, and others 
from private accounting firms. The findings 
revealed that there was consensus among 
auditors that auditing is primarily concerned 
with economy and efficiency rather than 
effectiveness; effectiveness auditors rely 
more on personal judgment than on objective 
evidence; and audit teams should consist of 
auditors from several different disciplines.
A year later, Pendlebury and Shreim 
(1991) extended their previous study by 
examining the attitudes of public-sector 
managers and financial officers of local 
authorities in England and Wales from 
two sectors of environmental health and 
finance. The results of the study were 
then compared with those from the Audit 
Commission group in the earlier study. 
This second study found that there were 
divergent opinions on the objectives of 
effectiveness auditing, composition of 
audit teams, and suitability of auditors to 
conduct effectiveness auditing.
Another related study was undertaken 
by Johnsen et al. (2001) in Finland and 
Norway. They explored the perceptions of 
the auditors and auditees on the usefulness 
of audit reports and the efficiency of 
performance auditing. The researchers 
discovered that both groups of auditees had 
little faith in performance audit reports. In 
Finland, auditees regarded the reports as 
not useful because they lacked valuable 
information and were too complicated 
to understand, while those in Norway 
regarded the auditors as incompetent and 
the reports were therefore not trustworthy.
 The current study differs from the 
above-mentioned prior research by 
focusing specifically on the practices of 
performance auditing in Malaysia. It aims 
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to furnish evidence of the divergent views 
on performance audit practices in the 
Malaysian public sector by soliciting the 
perceptions of both auditors in the National 
Audit Department (NAD) and Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) members.
RESEARCH METHOD
This study was aimed at exploring whether 
there is any divergence of views toward 
performance audit practices in the public 
sector, and if so, in which areas such 
divergence exists. Thus, a qualitative 
approach to data analysis was taken to be the 
most suitable and appropriate for achieving 
the research objectives. A semi-structured 
interview approach was used because it was 
judged to provide more in-depth insights 
into the views of the study participants.
The interviews were conducted with 12 
auditors of NAD and eight PAC members, 
using an interview schedule based on a review 
of the literature. A list of the interviewees by 
occupation is provided in Table 1. The PAC 
members were chosen mainly because they 
were the direct or main users of the Auditor 
General’s audit reports. Numerous measures 
were undertaken to minimise possible biases 
through preparation and careful design of 
the interview questions, and in the conduct 
of the interviews. The interview lasted from 
45 minutes to one and half hours, and was 
undertaken at each interviewee’s office 
or in another location determined by the 
interviewee. The interviews were tape-
recorded and transcribed, and summaries of 
the transcripts were subsequently verified 
by the original interviewees.
TABLE 1
Interviewees and their occupations
Participant Position
Auditor 1 State Audit Director 
Auditor 2 State Audit Director 
Auditor 3 Deputy Audit Director 
Auditor 4 Deputy Audit Director
Auditor 5 Deputy Audit Director
Auditor 6 Deputy Audit Director
Auditor 7 Deputy Audit Director
Auditor 8 Senior Auditor
Auditor 9 Senior Auditor
Auditor 10 Senior Auditor
Auditor 11 Senior Auditor
Auditor 12 Junior Auditor
PAC 1 Member of Parliament – Opposition Party
PAC 2 Member of Parliament – Opposition Party
PAC 3 Member of Parliament – Government Party
PAC 4 Member of Parliament – Government Party
PAC 5 Member of Parliament – Government Party
PAC 6 Member of Parliament – Opposition Party
PAC 7 Member of Parliament – Government Party
PAC 8 Member of Parliament – Government Party
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FINDINGS
The research findings of this study are 
presented and discussed according to 
specific themes such as auditor roles and 
responsibilities, auditor independence, 
auditor competence and audit reporting. 
They show some intriguing outcomes.
Auditor Roles and Responsibilities
All the auditors agreed that it was not their 
duty to detect fraud, arguing that it is rather 
the management’s responsibility to detect 
fraud and suspicious activities.
 “Not many people are clear as to our role 
and management’s role relating to fraud. 
Many people believe that detecting fraud is 
the concern of auditors. This is incorrect. 
Our role is to evaluate the adequacy of 
the existing system of internal controls by 
analyzing and testing. In this case, if we 
suspect fraud, then we will report it. The 
management is responsible for detecting 
any suspected fraud.” (Auditor 9)
Another auditor concurred that the public 
always misunderstands the responsibility 
of auditors with regard to this role, often 
expecting auditors to discover fraudulent 
activities in government agencies. Similarly, 
all the auditors agreed that it was not their 
responsibility to report fraudulent activities 
to the relevant authorities.
“We only bring matters to the attention of 
the relevant authority, normally the Anti-
Corruption Agency (ACA) if the fraud is 
significant. Usually, we just inform the 
management if we come across any suspected 
fraud or irregularities.” (Auditor 2) 
PAC members, on the other hand, were 
clearly disappointed with the auditors’ 
present efforts of detecting fraud. One PAC 
member reported that the lack of an audit 
mandate was the main reason auditors 
turned away from this particular role. 
Another PAC member felt that it was the 
absence of formal procedures for detecting 
fraud. She stated:
“At the moment, no. There are so many 
things that have to be done by the Auditor 
General. As far as I am concerned, they 
do not go for fraud. They only investigate 
when they discover or suspect something 
is wrong, or any misappropriation exists 
during the audit; thus, this one aspect 
needs to be improved. What happens if they 
do not discover it during the audit? The 
procedures should be there to be followed 
by the auditors.” (PAC 6) 
With regard to fraud reporting, all PAC 
members seemed to be pleased with the 
present practices of auditors. The auditors 
regularly inform them of any incidents 
referred to the respective authorities and 
adequately highlight these in the audit 
reports. The comment below summarises 
the PAC members’ perspectives on this 
role:
 “They did a good job in terms of reporting 
[fraud]. They highlighted in the report 
about their findings. Based on what they 
said [during a PAC meeting], sometimes, 
they also referred the case to the MACC 
[Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission.” 
(PAC 6)
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Auditor’s Independence
A general trend in the perceptions of the 
auditors is that they are free from external 
influence because the decisions they make 
are based on available facts and evidence. 
Nevertheless, a few auditors claimed that 
there were occasions where they received 
warnings and memoranda from certain 
parties requesting auditors not to disclose 
certain information in the audit report.
“Usually, when it happens, they ask us not 
to disclose such information. It all depends 
on our top management. Usually we do not 
disclose reports like that to the public.” 
(Auditor 7)
PAC members showed mixed reactions 
on this issue. All the PAC members from 
the government parties perceived that 
the auditors were free of influence from 
any party. However, two PAC members 
from the opposition parties claimed that 
influence from outside parties is possible 
despite the guarantee of independence of 
the Auditor General required under the 
constitution and the Audit Act 1957, as 
claimed by one PAC member:
“…the Auditor General is still under 
government control. If they are too 
aggressive, they might be subjected to 
actions by the Prime Minister. For example 
in the case of auditing the Finance Ministry, 
politicians would get involved. This is a 
sensitive issue.” (PAC 1) 
In addition, the interviewees were 
asked about the suitability of the NAD 
in providing professional management 
advisory services (MAS) to the auditees. As 
expected, the auditors did not perceive that 
this role would impair their independence. 
They argued that decision still rest with the 
management and auditors are there only to 
advice the agencies.
“Let’s say the auditee comes to us and 
asks for help in developing the rules or 
procedures for a project….we will help 
them but in the context of advising them 
only. We might say that this procedure 
is against the Treasury guidelines… or 
accounting principles or whatever and ask 
them to consider other options. In some 
cases, we might suggest a few options… 
but at the end it is up to the auditee to 
decide.” (Auditor 2)
The PAC members generally agreed 
among themselves, however, that offering 
MAS to the auditees would indeed impair 
the auditors’ independence because they 
might be auditing their own work and 
establishing a close relationship with the 
auditees. However, they were quick to 
add that this provision is not an issue in 
the public sector as long as the auditors 
only offer help and provide advice or 
suggestions.
Auditor Competence
Auditors expressed satisfaction with their 
own level of competence. They perceived 
that their current level of qualification, 
which requires a minimum degree in 
accounting, is adequate. They also believe 
that they have the necessary skills to carry 
out performance auditing. However, they 
also noted that obtaining a reasonable level 
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of experience in professional financial 
work is essential. All, except for one of the 
PAC members, thought that the auditors 
have adequate qualifications and skills, 
and that the procedure for the appointment 
of auditors is proper. Furthermore, they 
believe that auditors are subjected to 
continuous performance monitoring and 
provided with proper training. On the issue 
of hiring auditors from disciplines other 
than accounting, not all auditors shared the 
same views. Most of them supported the 
idea of employing new auditors from other 
disciplines, arguing that the knowledge and 
views of these new auditors would lead to 
better processes and outcomes. However, 
two auditors were against the idea of hiring 
auditors from other academic backgrounds, 
fearing that this practice would result 
in overstaffing in the long term, and that 
the present practice of seeking assistance 
from other government agencies is more 
practical. All the PAC members were in 
favour of NAD’s employing people from 
different disciplines to conduct performance 
audits, averring that some projects would 
require individuals who are knowledgeable 
in fields other than accounting.
Audit Reporting
Most auditors held the view that the 
contents of audit reports are adequate and 
they are also confident that these contents 
meet the users’ information requirements. 
They also believe that audit reports are 
useful to users. Most of them cited the use 
of the ‘balanced reporting’ approach—
addressing not only the weaknesses or 
the problems of a programme but also its 
successes and strengths—to support this 
view. Furthermore, the auditors explained 
that NAD regularly reviews the contents 
of report in terms of its structure, language 
and graphics so as to assist users in 
understanding the report. Unexpectedly, 
one senior auditor perceived that the 
audit report is not effective because of its 
outdated information, dissuading the users 
from implementing any recommendations. 
She remarked:
“I think the users do not use the information. 
Our audit report is not effective because the 
issues discussed are outdated.” (Auditor 2)
Audit reports were also thought to be 
limited in usefulness as they only describe 
what the auditors did and make impractical 
recommendations. Two PAC members 
concurred in this view, claiming that the 
present audit reports lack useful information 
such as expenditures, resources used and 
the impacts of audited programmes on the 
auditees and the public. Regarding the types 
of information that need to be included in 
the reports, the PAC members stressed 
that critical analyses on the performance 
and progress of programmes, including 
financial information, precise audit opinions 
and disagreements among the auditees on 
particular issues, need to be emphasised. 
One of the PAC members also expressed 
the need to include comments or statements 
from experts who have been involved 
with the audit. These comments may 
indicate that the auditors are not adequately 
addressing the users’ expectations in terms 
of programme performance.
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In contrast to the opinions of the 
auditors, most PAC members expressed 
dissatisfaction with the information 
included in the reports. Three PAC members 
claimed that the issues in the reports were 
outdated and believed this to be the main 
reason the public is not interested to read 
them.
“One of the big problems is that by the 
time certain problems are identified and 
put in the audit report, it’s possibly one or 
two years late. For instance, this happened 
two years ago but the report was produced 
last year. By the time the Auditor General 
identified the problem, it was already two 
or three years late, and it was another one 
or two years by the time it was presented 
to the parliament. Do you think people out 
there would be interested in this issue…
maybe they already know by the time the 
audit report is published.” (PAC 3)
Other PAC members mentioned that 
audit reports are descriptive in nature and 
fail to critically analyse multiple aspects of 
programmes.
“Actually, the auditors just record what 
the people did. They just list the problems, 
efficiencies, and delays…, such as why this 
money is not used and why so much money 
is used? ... they need to say what is the 
impact of the project.” (PAC 2)
As for the format of the audit report, the 
auditors indicated that the present format is 
adequate and very helpful to users reading 
the audit report. They also believe that no 
modification is required for the format. 
Although the auditors concurred that the 
current audit reports are too voluminous 
for many users, they argued that this is 
unavoidable because of the nature of 
the audit, which involves non-financial 
information. Nonetheless, one auditor did 
not perceive the current format as the main 
factor in discouraging the public from 
reading the audit report.
“It is not because the audit report looks so 
thick that makes the public reluctant to read. 
It has something to do with the attitude of 
our people. They do not care about what 
happens around them.” (Auditor 7)
The PAC members, however, believe 
that the format of audit reports needs to be 
improved. The present format was deemed 
inappropriate because it is standardised 
for all reports. Alternatively, they prefer to 
have a format that is more flexible and can 
be customised to the specific needs of an 
audit. One suggestion by the PAC members 
is to have an executive summary:
“It would be helpful if the auditors can 
provide the executive summary in the front 
section of the audit report. It would be 
much easier for me as a PAC member to 
get straight to the problems. There are lots 
of reports that I need to look at.” (PAC 1)
Three PAC members considered the 
current format to be too long, believing 
that it would lead to important issues being 
overlooked in the audit opinion or that 
users might be discouraged from reading it. 
Nevertheless, many of them agreed that the 
current format provided some benefits in 
terms of outlining the methods employed 
and the objectives of the audits.
Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 23 (S): 89 – 98 (2015)
Auditors’ and PAC Members’ Views on Performance Auditing Practices in Malaysia: A Qualitative Approach 
97
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings show that there is a significant 
divergence between auditors and PAC 
members about the duty of auditors to 
detect fraud. The present practice, certainly, 
is that the NAD auditors do not actively 
look for fraud and only report it if their 
suspicions are aroused during the course of 
the audit. The main reason for this approach 
is the absence of a specific mandate for 
fraud detection. PAC members, on the 
other hand, expect fraud detection to be a 
major reason for performing audits, while 
Chowdhury and Innes (1998) argued that 
fraud detection is an implied constitutional 
mandate. Clearly, the lack of a statutory 
requirement for fraud detection leads the 
auditors to believe that such detection is 
not a part of their duties, which contradicts 
with PAC members’ expectations.
As for the issue of auditors’ 
independence, most auditors claimed that 
they base their findings on the evidence, 
regardless of whether they have been 
subjected to any pressure from management 
or outside parties. Nevertheless, two 
auditors admitted that they were not allowed 
to include certain national-security-related 
or other controversial issues in their audit 
reports, and two out of eight PAC members 
believed that auditors could not always 
maintain their independence from external 
pressures, especially from politicians. 
They were convinced that the government 
administration still has at least a subtle 
indirect control over the NAD, primarily 
because the Auditor General is appointed 
on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister. The study found that some senior 
auditors did feel this influence, claiming 
that they are under pressure from their own 
managers and other governmental officers. 
This finding is in line with the work of 
McCrae and Vada (1997), which disclosed 
that the independence of the Auditor 
General is threatened by administrative 
forces who want to reduce audit operations 
and use their political leverage to influence 
audit results. This finding is also consistent 
with Chowdhury and Innes (1998), who 
found that, while auditors insisted that 
they are free from external influence, users 
perceived that the auditors are heavily 
influenced by their own management.
Another finding of this study is that, 
with the exception to two PAC members, 
auditors and PAC members agreed about 
the comprehensiveness of audit reports. 
Both groups considered the audit reports 
fair and balanced, incorporating sufficient 
information on the progress and impacts 
of the programmes audited. The reports 
include clear statements of the auditors’ 
opinions on particular issues, delineate 
management responsibility regarding those 
issues, and critique both strengths and 
weaknesses of the programmes. This finding 
is inconsistent, though, with Johnsen et al. 
(2001) who found that audit reports were 
overloaded with detailed information not 
actually useful to auditee management.
There was also a significant difference 
in the opinions of auditors and PAC 
members about the adequacy of the audit 
report format to meet users’ information 
requirements.  All the auditors believe that 
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the present format and length of audit reports 
is appropriate because subjective matters 
and non-financial information require 
lengthy explanations. They also felt that 
the standardised format makes the report 
easy to comprehend as it includes sections 
on all the critical aspects of programmes: 
planning, implementation, and monitoring.
In conclusion, the findings of this study 
showed that auditors and PAC members held 
different views about auditors’ independence, 
roles and responsibilities, as well as about 
the audit reports’ timeliness, content and 
format. Furthermore, these differences were 
substantive, not mere misunderstandings 
or inconsistencies in methods or standards. 
The most critical disagreement was over 
auditors’ role in detecting fraud, with PAC 
members believing such detection to be a 
major part of the job and auditors demurring 
that they had no specific mandate for such 
an approach.
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